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As the March 31 Ukrainian presidential elections approach, warfare continues in the 
east, and national reforms falter, analysts warn about the resurgence of old-- and the 
emergence of new--authoritarian threats in Ukraine. On the one hand, they argue that 
the ongoing war with Russia is used by the Poroshenko regime to strengthen its hold on 
power and encroach on citizens’ civil rights and freedoms. Every time the incumbent 
president runs for reelection, the threat of authoritarianism, this argument posits, arises 
from the presidency itself. On the other hand, “right wing nationalist trends” are 
tolerated by the government, an indifference that jeopardizes further democratization. 
While the post-revolutionary turbulence in Ukraine continues, others fear that society 
may wish for a strong hand, a leader capable of bringing peace and order, which may 
ultimately lead to some sort of authoritarianism. While acknowledging the various 
tangible pressures and challenges, this memo nonetheless argues that modern 
authoritarianism, in contrast to many post-Soviet states, is hardly possible in Ukraine. 
Three groups of structural, institutional, and agency-based factors make the emergence 
of an authoritarian regime in Ukraine highly improbable.  
 
Authoritarianism as a Socio-Political Construct 
 
Drawing on classical and modern studies of authoritarianism, the term is understood 
here as a sociopolitical construct, or a syndrome, where submission to authority is 
underpinned by a combination of people’s toleration of it, the leader’s charisma, and the 
state’s coercive apparatus. Authoritarianism is not just unaccountable use of power by a 
leader or political party. It usually consists of (a) an institutionalized monopoly on 
power that prevents any challenger from contesting the ruler by legal or extralegal 
means and (b) some minimal degree of public consent, which at times can grow into 
broad public support for a ruler—making for a highly desired “unity” between leader 
and people. Although the sources of authoritarian legitimacy as well as legitimation 
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strategies vary, this perceived “unity” is a necessary condition for any stable 
authoritarianist regime.  
 
Other features of authoritarianism such as limited political pluralism, minimal social 
mobilization, and vaguely defined limits on executive power are important, but the key 
is the mechanism employed by the single or collective ruler to achieve “unity” with the 
people. When the people voluntarily accept the power of the authority, a fully 
authoritarian (consolidated) regime is possible. This maximalist formula is suggested 
here in order to analytically dissect a fully authoritarian regime from its diminished 
forms such as “semi,” “competitive,” or “electoral” authoritarianism that often fall 
under the category of “hybrid regime.”    
 
Three groups of factors (see Table 1), when taken together, form a barrier against the 
emergence of a fully authoritarian regime in present-day Ukraine: The main factors 
within the structural, institutional, and agency-based groupings are: poor leadership 
legitimacy, poor economic performance, regional polarization, weak state repressive 
capacity, the relative weakness of the party of power, fragmented elite structure, 
growing linkage with the West, semi-presidentialism, legacy of a hybrid regime, lack of 
charismatic leadership, largely pro-democratic public attitudes, and the gravity of three 
waves of anti-authoritarian protest (in 1990, 2004, and 2014).  
 
Structural Constraints 
 
I begin with the key factor: legitimacy and the mechanism (legitimation) that helps to 
achieve a desired “unity” between leader and people. While legitimacy is a belief in a 
righteous political order, legitimation is a process of gaining support. Legitimacy is 
expressed in both the confidence in a leader and the government institutions 
empitomized by the leadership. As Christian von Soest and Julia Grauvogel at the GIGA 
Institute in Germany observe, claims to legitimacy can be input-based (foundational 
myths, ideology, personalism) or output-based (performance). When claims to 
legitimacy are met and supported, legitimation can be considered successful. 
 
First, since the beginning of independence, Ukrainians have demonstrated very low 
trust in the main state institutions (presidency, government, parliament) as well as in the 
personalities populating those institutions. Attempts to bridge this gap through various 
legitimation strategies (mostly procedures and performance) have not been successful. 
Especially detrimental for Ukrainian legitimacy has been poor economic performance. 
Since independence, Ukraine’s GDP has contracted by one third, from $188 billion in 
1991 to $124 billion in 2016. In such unfortunate conditions, support for the president 
has averaged 14 percent (2000-2015), while support for the parliament and the cabinet 
has been under 10 percent (6.5 and 9.6 respectively). As of June 2018, less than 14 percent 
of Ukrainians exhibited trust in the incumbent, President Petro Poroshenko, while more 
than 80 percent affirmed a lack of trust in him (as opposed to being neutral or unsure). 
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Overall, the stability of Poroshenko’s regime, as reflected in public attitudes regarding 
his third year in power, appeared to be lower than that of Viktor Yanukovych, the 
former, ousted president, at the same point in his presidential tenure. At present, with 
about a month left before the presidential election, only Volodymyr Zalensky, a 
screenwriter and actor who has never been in politics, seems to have a positive balance 
of trust vs. distrust. The point is that “unity” between the ruling elite and the citizenry 
clearly does not happen in Ukraine, making it dissimilar to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, 
Aleksandr Lukashenka’s Belarus, Viktor Orban’s Hungary, and Jarosław Kaczynski’s 
Poland.  
 
Second, autocrats face serious constraints in consolidating their power in regionally and 
culturally divided societies. For instance, Yanukovych was elected by votes coming 
mostly from the southeast of Ukraine and he faced serious opposition in the west and 
center. Although President Putin’s war against Ukraine brought about a growing sense 
of national unity, the Kremlin has some room for maneuver and is once again playing 
ethno-linguistic cards in the run–up to the election (and forthcoming parliamentary 
elections in October). Take for example oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, whose views on 
conflict resolution, according to The Independent, “are reliably pro-Moscow and have 
broadly evolved in step with the Kremlin.” Medvedchuk announced his candidacy for a 
parliamentary seat and has meanwhile endorsed Yuriy Boiko, a former minister close to 
Yanukovych, in the presidential election. It looks like Medvedchuk’s plan is to thwart 
the national consolidation process.  
 
Third, regional and identity divisions hinder the formation of a unified elite, an 
important factor of any regime consolidation. In contrast to its eastern or western 
neighbors, the Ukrainian elite inherited a fragmented structure, making consensual 
consolidation unlikely to be successful. When various elite factions compete for 
influence (and rents), none of them is able to monopolize power. Even in Viktor 
Yanukovych’s highly centralized Party of Regions, there were several competing groups 
and rival political machines such as Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna party. Also, 
critically, opposing oligarchic entities, like Poroshenko’s or Ihor Kolomoisky’s, make the 
concentration of power in one hand virtually impossible. Elite fragmentation persisted 
after the 2014 revolution and the major division now lies between a) pro- and anti-
reformers in parliament and society and b) the oligarchs in power versus the oligarchs 
outside of power (like Kolomoisky, Tymoshenko, or Serhiy Taruta). 
 
Next, an institutionalized monopoly on power is constrained by multiple political 
parties, limited repressive capacity of the state, and fragmented elite structures. No 
Ukrainian president or prime minister has managed to create a single party majority in 
parliament. Of the five post-independence Ukrainian presidents, only Yanukovych 
partially succeeded in building a power vertical through the Party of Regions.  
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Attempts to utilize the state repressive apparatus to prevent unrest, harass the 
opposition, and eliminate political rivals have had poor results in Ukraine. Three waves 
of mass political protest—against the communists in 1990, against stolen elections in 
2004, and against stolen dreams in 2014—proved the incumbents’ inability to apply force 
effectively. The security services became split and the military stood aside in all three 
crises. This puts Ukraine in clear contrast to numerous cases where the army intervened 
or was used by an incumbent to curb protests.  
 
Finally, Ukraine’s growing linkage with the West (via its EU Association Agreement and 
visa-free European travel) and growing dependency on Western financial and security 
support, compelled the Ukrainian elites to introduce new anti-corruption legislation and 
institutions. The effects of these Western institutional pressures are not immediate, yet 
even slow progress puts additional constraints on any attempts to rule without limits. 
Russia, of course, will remain an existential threat to Ukraine for decades, yet Putin’s 
aggression made the civilizational divorce apparently irreversible. After the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church gained independence from Moscow in October 2018, Russia lost a 
great deal of soft power in Ukraine.  
 
Institutional Constraints  
 
At least two institutional factors stand in the way of authoritarianism in Ukraine. These 
are semi-presidentialism and what I call institutionalized hybridity, or the legacy of 
being a hybrid regime.  
 
Presidentialism has been theorized as conducive to authoritarianism. Although Ukraine 
now has a premier-presidential form of government, experiments with institutional 
design reflect the inability of an incumbent to establish a fully presidential system. Every 
time Leonid Kuchma and Yanukovych sought to exceed the limits of their power, the 
parliament and society stood in their way. A recent idea by Tymoshenko to introduce a 
parliamentary system with strong prime ministerial powers is of the same repertoire, 
but it is hardly achievable because of rival elite factions and a lack of public support. 
Though imperfect, Ukrainians prefer some type of divided executive, a safeguard from 
establishing a model of Putin’s Russia.  
 
When it comes to hybridity, the form of Ukrainian government has been altered six 
times (in 1991, 1995, 1996, 2004, 2010, and 2014), but the regime’s core has only changed 
once, and that change lasted from the end of ‘80s to the mid ‘90s. Ukraine’s set of formal 
and informal institutions (comprised of competitive elections, the lack of proper rule of 
law, and the dominance of informal politics in political processes) has proven to be a 
stable hybrid political construct. It coalesced under Kuchma and survived both the 
Orange and the Euromaidan revolutions. Elites tend to like ineffective institutions 
because they allow for rent extraction without the use of outright violence. Ukraine’s 
“path dependency,” a term capturing the self-reinforcing nature of this system, has 
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prevented it from progressing toward democracy but has also precluded it from 
regressing toward authoritarianism. As long as this institutionalized hybridity remains a 
preferred state of affairs for the elites, the dominant trend in Ukraine’s regime dynamics 
will be hybridization and not democratization or a drift toward authoritarianism.  
 
Agency-Based and Societal Constraints 
 
In addition to structural and institutional barriers against authoritarianism, there are at 
least three agency and societal limitations: the lack of charismatic leadership, largely pro 
democratic public attitudes, and a legacy of three waves of anti-authoritarian protest.  
 
Of the three classic forms of authoritarianism—personalist, military, and one-party—the 
first is found to be less stable than one-party regimes. Ukraine has witnessed two failed 
attempts to establish some sort of one-man rule, first under Kuchma (1994-2004) and 
then under Yanukovych (2010-2014). While Kuchma failed to solve his succession 
dilemma but ultimately left office peacefully, Yanukovych failed on both counts and had 
to flee the country. Personalism, therefore, as a legitimating strategy in Ukraine, has 
never reached the level of creating a personalist cult, like in Russia, Belarus, or Turkey. 
 
Of societal factors, a controversy exists in how to interpret the two contradictory trends 
in Ukrainians’ political attitudes: a) demand for a strong leader and b) support for 
democracy.  
 
Citizens wishing for a strong leader “who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections” has grown by 20 percent over the last two decades. While in 1995-97, this view 
was supported by slightly more than 50 percent of the population, in 2010-14, it grew to 
71 percent. In Ukraine, however, the disaffection with democratic forms of government 
and skepticism toward liberal institution are have more to do with the lack of rule of law 
than with an actual preference for strongman rule. When asked (in 2009) “What do you 
mean by the strong hand [leader]?,” 62 percent agreed that a leader must act exclusively 
in compliance with the law, while only 15 percent favored the option that “in case of 
necessity a leader may limit the rights and freedoms for the sake of order.” 
 
The idea that Ukrainians are longing for a Pinochet should, therefore, be interpreted as a 
desire for having a leader capable of establishing strong rule of law. In the choice 
between democratic and authoritarian rule, Ukrainians (as of 2010) clearly preferred 
democracy (62 percent) over authoritarianism (28 percent). Similarly, almost 60 percent 
agreed that laws must be followed and only less than 7 percent believed that laws are to 
be bypassed. As one study revealed, in 2000-2011, democratic values prevailed both in 
the Lviv and Donetsk regions.  
 
Finally, Ukraine has a history of successful anti-authoritarian protests, which makes it 
rather unique in the post-Soviet context. In two of them, the Orange and the 
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Euromaidan revolutions, from 18 to 20 percent of adult citizens participated, which is 
between 5-7 million people. Although the democratic impetus of these revolutions was 
largely compromised by the old practices, society has learned how to mobilize against 
the authoritarian threat.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In order to take root, authoritarianism, like democracy, requires fertile ground. The table 
below summarizes the logic and relative weight of the three groups as well as individual 
factors working to prevent the formation of authoritarianism in Ukraine. Of note, the 
structural constraints are more important than the institutional ones, and the 
institutional ones are more important than the agency-centered ones. 
 
Table 1. Authoritarian-Prevention Factors 
 
    Structural     Institutional     Agency-based 
- poor leadership legitimacy 
- poor economic performance 
- regional polarization 
- fragmented elite structure 
- weak state repressive 
capacity 
- weakness of the party of 
power 
- growing linkage with the 
West 
- semi–presidentialism 
- institutionalized hybridity 
- lack of charismatic 
leadership 
- pro-democratic public 
attitudes 
- legacy of successful anti-
authoritarian protest 
 
The overall configuration means that any attempt to impose authoritarian rule from 
above, as attempted by Kuchma and Yanukovych, faces the cumulative resistive effect 
produced by these three groups of factors. Ukraine’s prospects for authoritarianism are 
therefore significantly limited, which should allow the country to breakout of hybridity 
and progress toward a secure, democratic future—even in the current climate of 
backsliding democracy, populism, and Russian influence campaigns.  
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